Monday, 3 July 2017

Toomas Karmo: Further to Mr Kaller: Three Theological Shocks

Quality assessment:



On the 5-point scale current in Estonia, and surely in nearby nations, and familiar to observers of the academic arrangements of the late, unlamented, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (applying the easy and lax standards Kmo deploys in his grubby imaginary "Aleksandr Stepanovitsh Popovi nimeline sangarliku raadio instituut" (the "Alexandr Stepanovitch Popov Institute of Heroic Radio") and his  grubby imaginary "Nikolai Ivanovitsh Lobatshevski nimeline sotsalitsliku matemaatika instituut" (the "Nicolai Ivanovich Lobachevsky Institute of Socialist Mathematics") - where, on the lax and easy grading philosophy of the twin Institutes, 1/5 is "epic fail", 2/5 is "failure not so disastrous as to be epic", 3/5 is "mediocre pass", 4/5 is "good", and 5/5 is "excellent"): 4/5. Justification: There was enough time to write out the  necessary points to reasonable length.


Revision history:


All times in these blog "revision histories" are stated in UTC (Universal Coordinated Time/ Temps Universel Coordoné,  a precisification of the old GMT, or "Greenwich Mean Time"), in the ISO-prescribed YYYYMMDDThhmmZ timestamping format. UTC currently leads Toronto civil time by 4 hours and currently lags Tallinn civil time by 3 hours.


  • 20170705T1457Z/version 3.1.0: Kmo corrected a thoroughly embarrassing error regarding the Office of the Hours. (He had thought, as a layman who has not ventured beyond Laudes Matitutinae, Hora Vespera, and Completorium, that the present canonical schedule is eightfold, when in fact it is sevenfold - with the pre-Vatican II  "Prime" now excised.) - Kmo slightly improved his reference to ancient (pre-Roman) scriptural redactors, by writing of "pasting-together". - Kmo somewhat expanded  his questions for the author of http://www.hebrew4christians.com. - Kmo reserved the right to make further tiny, purely cosmetic, nonsubstantive tweaks over the coming 48 hours, as here-undocumented versions 3.1.1, 3.1.2, 3.1.3, ... . 
  • 20170704T2042Z/version 3.0.0: Kmo finished converting an undisplayed upgrade of his displayed "version 2.0.0" point-form outline into full-sentences prose. He was now about to start polishing his "version 3.0.0". He reserved the right to make tiny, purely cosmetic, nonsubstantive tweaks over the coming 48 hours, as here-undocumented versions 3.0.1, 3.0.2, 3.0.3, ... . 
  • 20170704T0341Z/version 2.0.0: Kmo uploaded a much-polished point-form outline. 
  • 20170704T0001Z/version 1.0.0: Kmo uploaded a point-form outline which was itself not correctly polished. He hoped to continue working on this essay over the coming 3 or 4 hours, improving the point-form outline and converting at least part of it into full-sentences prose. He feared he might have to finish the full-sentences-prose part of his work later still, perhaps around 20170704T1700Z.


[CAUTION: A bug in the blogger server-side software has in some past weeks shown a propensity to insert inappropriate whitespace at some points in some of my posted essays. If a screen seems to end in empty space, keep scrolling down. The end of the posting is not reached until the usual blogger "Posted by Toomas (Tom) Karmo at" appears. - The blogger software has also shown a propensity to generate HTML that gets formatted in different ways on different client-side browsers, perhaps with some browsers not correctly reading in the entirety of the "Cascading Style Sheets"  (CSS) which on all ordinary Web servers control the browser placement of margins, sidebars, and the like. If you suspect CSS problems in your particular browser, be patient: it is probable that while some content has been shoved into some odd place (for instance, down to the bottom of your browser, where it ought to appear in the right-hand margin), all the server content has been pushed down into your browser in some place or other. - Finally, there may be blogger vagaries, outside my control, in font sizing or interlinear spacing. - Anyone inclined to help with trouble-shooting, or to offer other kinds of technical advice, is welcome to write me via Toomas.Karmo@gmail.com.]



Last week, I reprinted, with Eire-based journalist Brian Kaller's kind permission, Mr Kaller's essay "The Past is a Foreign Country". This was originally published two or three or so weeks ago, at  http://restoringmayberry.blogspot.ca/2017/06/the-past-is-foreign-country.html.

Mr Kaller urges our reconnecting with our cultural roots. A large part of Mr Kaller's desired reconnection, indeed in the view of many (myself included) a part central to Mr Kaller's aim, is a reconnecting with our spiritual traditions. 

Mr Kaller and I both write as Catholics. These days, people everywhere have their hilarious stories of inauthentic spirituality. I refrain, even in mirth, from pointing fingers at the Protestant Christian (post-1500) world, at the New Age (post-1960) world, or at other faith traditions postdating the fall of Imperial Rome. I instead confine myself to Catholicism.

Catholicism is an intercontinental way of life equally familiar to Mr Kaller and to me, and familiar also to many in our respective readerships. Catholicism might be said to go back to a Passover Seder (or perhaps, depending on how you read the Gospel of John, to a mere Seder-like meal, within Passover Week) from between A.D. 32 and A.D. 34. This makes Catholicism older than most of the theological traditions nowadays on offer - excepting, of course, the still-more-venerable Judaism from which Catholicism sprang. Catholicism has, on the other hand, been sorely buffeted over the generations, including our own.

The story I am about to relate rings reasonably true to my impressions of Ontario Catholicism. It sounds, to my ears, reasonably believable, even though a hasty Google fact-checking effort in the afternoon of 2017-07-03 bore me no fruit:

The year is 1975 or so. An Ontario parish is approaching the culmination of its Mass, with the Victim now present in Paten and Chalice under the respective forms of bread and wine. The approach is being made in a spirit of Vatican II liturgical "updating". [However ill-instructed this particular parish might have been, I cannot believe it would actually have stepped into heresy or schism through an outright denial of the "Real Presence" Eucharistic teaching.] As the People of God step forward for Eucharist, the choir launches into song. Their song stands far from Gregorian chant, or even from earnest prewar Anglo-Saxon Catholic-cum-Anglican-cum-Presbyterian-cum-Methodist hymnody. And yet it is familiar enough from the Canadian stage or the Canadian screen. [Although I have not myself seen the film, I do know the tune from radio.] So I imagine lots of people, as they step forward for the Eucharist that is supposed to be the apex of their week, are kinda-sorta pleased: 

To dream the impossible dream
To fight the unbeatable foe
To bear with unbearable sorrow
To run where the brave dare not go

To right the unrightable wrong
To love pure and chaste from afar
To try when your arms are too weary
To reach the unreachable star


[and so on, and so on]

What can we do, in our own private efforts as individual lay Catholics, for reconnection with cultural roots - especially in the face of such unbearably, and tragically, comic vulgarity? It is necessary to read our New Testaments - notably our Gospels and our Paul - intelligently, informing ourselves on their historical context. This means venturing, in as serious and thorough a way as may prove feasible for us in our particular individual circumstances, into the Old Testament. At all points in our (perhaps modest) Hebrew explorations, we shall have to be mindful firstly that the Gospels were in part written for readerships versed in the canonical Hebrew books, and secondly that Paul was himself a professed theologian, of formidable Pharisee-faction credentials.

The Old Testament is in any case (quite apart from our urgent contemporary Catholic need to read it) gripping at the level of secular literature. Its fascination outclasses even the powerful pull of Virgil, Caesar, and Cicero. With those great Romans, we are spending pleasant hours inspecting dried, meticulously arranged, blossoms, on the heavy paper sheets of a herbarium. With the Old Testament, on the other hand, we are outdoors, in rain and wind and sun, intent on field botany. I do not denigrate Latin literature. And yet how much truer to Real Life - how much more like a thing written by some creative Facebooker or blogger this very morning - is that chaotic little library we call the Old Testament!

I do write "chaotic" and "library" advisedly. The chaos comes from violent ancient pastings-together (and perhaps even cuttings-out) before the text assumed the carefully conserved form we find in our official Bibles (and which the philology professors have found also, to everyone's relief, in the big ceramic jars at Qumran, greatly though Qumran does antedate the conventionally received manuscripts). Persons desiring an impression of the violent ancient pastings-together have only to ponder the two strains present in the Genesis creation-of-humans narrative - how did Eve get made? -  by (for instance) glancing at footnotes in that Catholic-student workhorse which is the New Jerusalem Bible.

As for "library": this, not "book" in the singular, is the term needed for a collection so bulky, and also so varied in literary genres, styles-within-genre, and periods of composition. One must on no account get misled by our modern printing technology, which - wisely enough forsaking the scrolls, baskets, and jars of our encumbered remote forefathers - compresses the whole collection between a single pair of covers, through setting type densely onto some hundreds of pages.

The Trueness to Life comes despite - or rather, in some ways comes despite, in other ways comes because of - that so-exotic little library's atavistic, Epic-of-Beowulf, Kalevala-and-Kalevipoeg, attachment to the fabulous and grotesque. As the troubled history of Estonia, with 1944 exile and disapora and post-1991 homecoming, is only a shadow of the Major Thing - the history of Jewish suffering from the successive destructions of the Divided Kingdoms up to the happier modern days of Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion - so also our Fenno-Ugric narrative pragmatisms and extravagances pale in comparison with that exotic little library. I will cite a few examples, paraphrasing from memory or quoting from the New Jerusalem Bible, and perhaps stressing more the pragmatic than the (so easily found) extravagant:

  • Before the Twelve Tribes have kings, they have "Judges", who [so I gather] combine the modern functions of counsellor and arbitrator. Hebrew society is patriarchal to the core. And yet, writes Judges 4:4,5: "Deborah, a prophetess, wife of Lappidoth, was judging Israel /.../. She used to sit under Deborah's Palm between Ramah and Bethel in the highlands of Ephraim, and the Israelites would come to her for justice."
  • The attributes of a Practical Wife, some centuries after Deborah, are seen by the poet-author of Proverbs 31 to include skills in real estate, not to mention the possession of a certain sway within the municipality: "She gets up while it is still dark/ giving her household their food,/  giving orders to her serving girls.// She sets her mind on a field, then she buys it;/ with what her hands have earned she plants a vineyard./.../ She holds out her hands to the poor,/she opens her arms to the needy.// Snow may come, she has no fears for her household,/with all her servants warmly clothed.// She makes her own quilts,/ she is dressed in fine linen and purple.// Her husband is respected at the city gates,/ Taking his seat among the elders of the land."
  • Military trouble: one or more of the Twelve Tribes convert the X People to the Hebrew faith (for some value of "X", which of course I forget), and impose the requisite circumcision, and then hack the X People to bits while they are still in pain from their so-elective surgery.
  • The Chomsky-like or Solzhenitsyn-like Ezekiel is commanded on Divine authority to bake bread from wheat, barley, beans, lentils, millet, and spelt, and to eat it lying on his side for 390 days: "Of this food, you are to weigh out a daily portion of twenty shekels and eat it a little piece at a time." The awkward proceeding is to be a testimony against Ezekiel's faithless people, for "this is how the Israelites will have to eat their defiled food, wherever I disperse them among the nations." [Well, actually, unlike Chomsky and Solzhenitsyn, Ezekiel is the social critic who does stuff in mime, as an ancient Marcel Marceau. Today's seminary professors, I gather, find his Hebrew prose style drab, in contrast with the majesty of Isaiah. But being strong in mime does count for much.] "You are to eat this bread in the form of a barley cake baked where they can see you, on human dung. /.../ I then said, Lord [DIVINE-NAME], my soul is not defiled. From my childhood until now, I have never eaten an animal that has died a natural death or been savaged; no tainted meat has ever entered my mouth. 'Very well,' he said, 'I grant you cow-dung instead of human dung; you are to bake your bread on that.'" 
If one had to compose a publisher's blurb for this astounding bookshelf, one could perhaps write, "Real People, Doing Real Things". So, I repeat, it is a good idea to learn Hebrew - certainly from the standpoint of Catholicism, but even from the standpoint of being in a secular sense instructed.

At the moment, I am about halfway through my seminary-level textbook, Gary Pratico's and Miles Van Pelt's Basics of Biblical Hebrew. I have covered essentially all elements of noun-adjective-pronoun syntax - the hard-to-remember vowel changes such as "Propretronic Reduction" (some long vowels become short when their nouns, through acquiring suffixes, leave the problematic vowel too far from the vowel that carries the stress), the "Compensatory Lengthening", the charming little Daghesh-Forte dot that goes with the definite article often-but-not-always, the "Construct Chain", and so on. (The extravagantly Levantine flavour of this philology might be conveyed by taking a Pratico-and-Van Pelt "Construct Chain" example from Judges 9:11: "all of the family of the house of the father of his mother" - or as I would myself prefer to write it, "all-of/the-family-of/the-house-of/the-father-of/his mother".) Further, I have worked through the inner core of the verb, whose subsequent layered intricacies consume the still-to-be-studied second half of Pratico and Van Pelt. What I have so far worked through are verbs in the Qal stem, in both Perfect and Imperfect, both Strong and Weak, including the "Waw" (or "Vav") Consecutive.

This is now enough, as I realized upon taking stock on 2017-07-03, to enable the actual thinking of Hebrew thoughts, in the same spirit as I offered to students of Estonian in my blogspot posting of 2017-02-06 or 2017-02-07. (That was "Part B" of the multi-installment essay "Practicalities of Studying Estonian". Specially relevant in "Part B" is the material under subheading "3.4 An Exercise in Estonian Thinking".) For with the Construct Chain, the pronouns and pronominal suffixes, the definite article, and related topics covered, and with a translation to hand, one can hope to read the original in at least a gappy sort of way, confining one's translation-crutch gap-fillers to the verbs (when these are, moreover, Imperative, Infinitive Construct, Infinitive Absolute, or Participle, in the six non-Qal stems - the commonplace Qal Perfect and Qal Imperfect now rank, fortunately, as terra bene cognita).

To reach this admittedly modest stage took me a rather long time. GNU/Linux flat-ASCII timelogs show my Brian-Keller-spirited project to have kicked off on 2009-11-01, racking up 169 hours, 26 minutes by 2013-12-09. Then I gave up, in boredom and discouragement, until 2016-02-10. On or around 2016-02-10, I took fresh inspiration from some good Web materials (distinct, however, from the still deeper, still more thrilling Web materials I am going to cite as one of this week's "theological shocks"). By the end of last week, I had reached a cumulative Hebrew total of 280 hours and 2 minutes. It has been a matter of grabbing a little time here, a little time there - perhaps 30 minutes on some good morning, and then no time at all for a couple of busy or depressed days, and then once again grabbing 30 minutes on each of two or three days.

But now there is something of a watershed. I want to chronicle it this week as a matter of urgency, even for the present week neglecting my ongoing duty to write on the analytical philosophy of perception and action. What I have to put on record this week is a triple personal theological earthquake from the Sunday which was 2017-07-02.

****

What I categorize as the first shock was my unexpectedly finding, in a place I had not thought of examining, an adequately reasonable - and eminently Judaism-centred - discussion of a question in Catholic religious philosophy. What does Saint Thomas Aquinas mean by calling the Divinity "Pure Being", completely "simple" and fully actualized to the exclusion of all mere "potency"?

When I was still in academic philosophy, I spent twelve or so months (from 1987 September through 1988 August) at Indiana's University of Notre Dame, wrestling with this question. In the end, I did not achieve much. So I think Notre Dame ended up wasting money on my salary. I did, I think, dimly note back then, possibly from a remark made by Notre Dame authority Prof. Alvin Plantinga, an anticipation of Saint Thomas Aquinas in a place one would least expect it - namely, in the pages of one of the more primitive works in the Scary Little Library, Exodus 3. On 2017-07-02, however, I found to my surprise that the possible Exodus 3 foreshadowing, which seems to have registered with me just faintly at Notre Dame back in 1987 or 1988, is in fact well known. I was reading in a popularizing work on Jewish history, the 1975 Time-Life Books volume The Emergence of Man: The Israelites. Here is what I found. (Although the author makes no mention of Saint Thomas, those particular dots are easily connected.) My popularizing author's passage becomes particularly poignant because it captures two disparate things - a possible anticipation of high philosophy in Exodus 3, and then the possible incomprehension of Moses's immediate successors. I quote with redactions, replacing the author's use of the Name with "[NAME]", and his use of the Name's written four-letter name-of-Name with "[TETRAGRAMMATON]". (In reading Hebrew aloud, one is asked by tradition to make a different kind of adjustment, reading those four letters not phonetically but as the word - common, I think, even in ancient secular Hebrew political contexts - for "Lord".) 

/.../ there is much evidence that, far from being Egyptian in origin, the idea of the personal god is Semitic. In Exodus, the Israelites' god comes into sharp relief and takes on some new characteristics.

First, he has acquired the name [NAME]. In ancient Hebrew - whose alphabet had few, if any, vowels - the word is written [TETRAGRAMMATON], and the same four consonants occur in different forms of the Hebrew verb "to be." This fact has led some scholars to link the name to various concepts of being.

By the Biblical account Moses, standing with his hands in front of his face to shield it from the radiance of the vision before him, asks his god: "If I go to the Israelites and tell them that the God of their forefathers has sent me to them, and they ask me his name, what shall I say?" The answer in the the original Hebrew text is cryptic: it reads Eheyeh-asher-Eheyeh. Since the dawn of Biblical study and translation, that answer has been rendered with variations of phrasing; but it has always convened the same general sense: "I AM; that is who I am. Tell them that I AM has sent you to them."

Scholars have filled pages on the meaning of that enigmatic phrase, and on the name [NAME] that derives from it; but they can come to no agreement. One theory is that [TETRAGRAMMATON] meant "I am" in the sense of everlasting existence. The important point, however, is that by the time [TETRAGRAMMATON] was committed to writing - which did not happen for at least 200 years after the desert journey, during which the name first came into use - the Israelites themselves had probably lost track of the original meaing; they held the name [NAME] sacred simply because it designated their god.

They also incorporated it extensively in naming their children, following a common practice of the times. Like the Egyptian pharaohs Thutmose, Ptahmose and Ramses, Near Easterners generally made extensive use of their gods' names in their own. For example, the Assyrian king Ashurbanipal's name incorporates that of the god Ashur. The Israelites applied the name [NAME] to their priests and prophets as well as to their offspring - either as a way of invoking the god's favour for the individual or of offering a prayer of thanks. Familiar examples, in which the last element of the name - iah - is a form of [NAME], include Hezekiah (meaning "[NAME] is my strength"), Jeremiah ("May [NAME] lift up") and Nehemiah ("[NAME] has comforted"). 

Is the Time-Life author being eccentric? A quick glance at the one suitable scholarly resource on my rather thinly stocked shelves, namely the old Jerome Biblical Commentary (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1968) suggests, reassuringly, that the author is in the scholarly mainstream. For in the old Jerome Biblical Commentary, we again find an endorsement of the link with "to be", and the added promising detail that the Exodus 3 "to be" verb "can only be a causative Hiphil". (Alas, my knowledge of verbs presently extends only through the Qal stems, and so does not presently embrace the Other Six, in whose menacing ranks stands Hiphil. But the Hiphil reference is promising. The experience is a little like serving Sherlock Holmes as some fumbling Watson, and managing to note that yes, a helpful fingerprint indeed appears on that bloodied lead pipe beside Colonel Mustard's dying cranium, on the conservatory floor.)

The old Jerome does admittedly mention also a competing interpretation, on which Exodus 3 conveys the refusal of the Divinity to divulge a name. But the competing interpretation is given only for the sake of completeness - as an alternative for the view that the old Jerome, in consonance with Sunday's popularizing Time-Life author, favours.

My little discovery suggests that I must now keep working, somehow, even on philosophical problems - committed though I must always remain to my more respectable chosen fields of physics, astronomy, mathematics, and practical computing. I think I will have to keep philosophy simmering on a back burner, resisting the temptation to dump it brusquely into the darkness of the freezer chest.

My 1987/1988 failure at Notre Dame notwithstanding, I do know that some modest sense can be made of the old Aristotelian-Thomist dictum that "There is a scientific discipline studying being as such, and the properties which being has insofar as it is being." Various rigorous things, admittedly falling short of  Exodus 3 conceptual heights, can be said about being-as-such.

For instance, we can and must contrast being-knotted (an "accidental mode of being") with being-a-knot (the "substantial being" which is necessarily had by the knot in the rope, for all such times as the rope stays in its present knotted condition). - A further example of this same general point: we can and must contrast glowing (an "accidental mode of being" which might befall a radar screen) with being-a-glow (the "substantial being" that is necessarily had by the blip in the screen, as long as that present glowing continues).

A fully worked-out theory here must - this much I did note at Notre Dame - regard the knot's being-in-existence-now as proceeding "in" the rope's being-knotted-now. In general, the idea must be that one thing's existing can proceed "in" another thing's taking on one or another mode of accidental being. This is formally a little like - the formal analogy should perhaps not be pressed too hard - the idea to which I must return next week or thenabouts, in future installments of my perception-and-action essay: we see the coffee cup "in" seeing a patch of light on the retinal surface, and even that little patch of light we see "in" seeing some recondite cranial neuronal event.

Again, we can and must develop, as an exercise in quantified tense logic, complete with various axiomatizations in the manner of Arthur N. Prior (1914-1969) and various corresponding canonical-model completeness proofs with reference to formal semantics in the spirit of Prof. Saul Kripke (1940-), a view of existence on which to exist is to have a property.  Such properties can themselves be tensed or modalized: a presently existing bird, for instance, might have the (tensed) property of being-destined-17-days-from-now-to-be-pulling-on-at-least-one-worm, and the (modalized) property of being not-actually-and-yet-nevertheless-possibly flying. Formally, we have to upgrade the usual notation for tensed predicate logic, writing open variables not only as suffixes to predicate letters but additionally as prefixes. On the appropriate notation, "xF17y R yx" means "x now has the property of being-such-that 17-days-from-now y has the property of being such that y R-eth x". This entails (writing the usual existential quantifier "Ex" for "at least one entity x is such that" and the usual existential quantifier "Ey" for "at least one entity y is such that")  "Ex F17 Ey y R-eth x", and also entails the logically weaker "F17 Ex Ey y R-eth x", and yet does not entail "Ex Ey F17 y R-eth x" (since it could be that no two things now existing are destined to be 17 days from now related to each other as R-er and R-ed; a bird existing now might be destined to be pulling on a worm that has not yet come into existence).

Again, we can and must explore "adverbial modes of being". It is one thing to be glowing, and a different thing to be glowing dimly. We additionally can and must explore "iterated adverbial modes of being", as when we distinguish a radar screen's glowing-dimly-through-a-filter from its glowing-through-a-filter dimly.

It may conceivably prove in some way helpful to link substantial being with adverbial modes of being, by saying that just as glowing can be going-on-dimly, so "izzing" can be going-on-glowingly (when a glow exists), and also going-on-screenly (when a screen exists), or for that matter going-on-sparrowly (when a sparrow exists) and going-on-wormly (when a worm exists). Is the fact that, in general, "x Q-eth M-ly N-ly" and "x Q-eth N-ly M-ly" have different truth-conditions of potential relevance here, as we struggle - perhaps by introducing neologisms such as "izzeth wormly" - to disentangle the quasi-mathematical formalities of being from the limitations of the so-sloppy human languages that are the longstanding, so painfully limited, traditional Homo sapiens tools for describing being?

Such formal investigations comprise a field, explored somewhat in Greek and mediaeval times, and subsequently perhaps left lying rather fallow, that might be termed "formal metaphysics" or "analytical metaphysics". The field is at least in part to be investigated with the mathematical or para-mathematical tools of quantified modal logic ("modal operators with predicates and quantifiers") and quantified tense logic ("tense operators with predicates and quantifiers") - eventually including even sortal-relativized quantifiers, in the spirit of the recently departed Catholic logician-philosopher Prof. Peter Geach (1916-2013).  (At this point I have had, for the third time in this week's writing, to name a philosopher's name, in defiance of my as-a-general-rule-necessary Igominy and Humiligation Precept from 2017-05-22 or 2017-05-23.)

Part of the theory here is that u can be the same S as, and yet a different T from v.  - I indeed argued at the Cambridge Moral Sciences Club in a short visit around 1982 that even the notion of equivalence relation has to be sortal-relativized, with binary relation sigma being "an equivalence relation on Ss", and yet "not an equivalence relation on Ts".

At Cambridge, they somehow saw my radical sortal-relativization as in some sense a successful reductio ad absurdum  of Prof. Geach. Prof. Geach (I do not think he was in town when I read my paper) at some stage intimated to me that I had developed his ideas in an incorrect way. Well, we'll see. Some younger person may some day be able to take up some of this stuff where I have left off.

Perhaps, for all anyone now knows, philosophers in the remoter future might be able to turn Saint Thomas into something formally rigorous, while at the same time shedding light on what the Exodus 3 author so evocatively wrote so long before the malign dawn of Philosophy Departments. I am inclined to think that the way forward involves breaking down interdepartmental barriers, so that there is eventually a cadre of young analysts equally at home in three different academic places, one of them currently not communicating well with the other two - in the Department of Physics, in the Department of (Pure) Mathematics, and (a place I normally love to ridicule, for its self-chosen intellectual isolation) in the Department of Philosophy.

****  

The second theological shock was my 2017-07-02 reading in a site with a self-explanatory URL - http://www.hebrew4christians.com. I found the site author, theologian-philologist-philosopher John Parsons, communicating a way of reading the Old Testament which embraces my idea of thinking Hebrew thoughts, and yet goes further. Christians, stresses Mr Parsons, can and should aspire not only to the thinking of Hebrew thoughts but to something more radical - to the outright leading of Jewish lives.

His http://www.hebrew4christians.com explains, in page upon gripping page, how to go about the wider and more radical task. The author explains how to keep Shabbat, from Friday evening to Saturday sunset. He explains how to mourn (dissecting the Kaddish, including the bereavement Kaddish, at http://www.hebrew4christians.com/Prayers/Daily_Prayers/Kaddish/kaddish.html).

He also explains how to laugh. Under his homepage "Humor" link are jokes about Einstein, about the drooling-and-yet-ever-so-frum bear, about Jewish mothers, and the like.

His mention of Jewish mothers does remind me of a Jewish-Catholic story. I digress into this for a moment, as one might imagine a television talk-show guest waxing loquacious under the combined warming influence of studio lamps and Ms Oprah Winfrey. I presume the story is absent from Mr Parsons's collection. I heard it here in Ontario ten or fifteen or twenty years ago on the radio, from some Jewish microphone comedienne:

So I had to hire a hall for my daughter's Bat Mitzvah, and I was driving through town checking things out. I saw this big sign: OUR LADY OF PERPETUAL GUILT. Well, I said to myself, this one has got to be Jewish. But when I parked at the office and went in to talk to the reception desk, I found it wasn't Jewish. 

In all his various expressions of Jewish modes of living, Mr Parsons reminds us of a point readily forgotten: namely, that a language is embedded in a wider way of cooking, eating, dressing, and socializing - in a word, of being. If we are to think authentically in a language, we cannot remain strangers to the concrete modes of human existence from which those human linguistic forms have sprung.

But what can Mr Parsons's culture-study precepts - he is himself not explicitly writing as a Catholic - mean in Catholic terms?

The Catholic will surely follow Paul, and also Mr Parsons, in rejecting the legalistic demand for male circumcision.

As for Shabbat, whose faithful observance Mr Parsons does recommend, I would as a Catholic layman respectfully propose the following pair of points:

  • The unique position of the Jewish nation in the ongoing "Economy of Salvation" is to be affirmed, in deference to the contemporary Catholic Magisterium. The pre-Vatican II Catholic deprecations of Judaism, some of which ranked in their day as at least quasi-authoritative, are now to be in their turn deprecated. In particular, the pre-Vatican II Good Friday prayer imputing guilt to the Jewish nation, and such 1910-era Catholic Encyclopedia phrasings as "the deep and wide racial difference between Jews and Christians" (abrasive language viewable at http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/08399a.htm) are now to be deprecated. Wind-vane theology? Doctrine-à-la-mode? But Vatican II rightly remarked, Ecclesia semper reformanda - "The Church is at all times a thing-to-be-reformed." 
  • Individual contemporary Catholics are, however, to consider themselves as innocent in the unfortunate historical drama enacted by their remote historical predecessors, as the centuries-long process of Church reform grinds forward. The history being what it unfortunately is, there is now no binding obligation to observe Shabbat on a Saturday rather than on a Sunday, just as there is no binding obligation to observe Shabbat on a Sunday rather than on a Saturday. What is binding is only that a Shabbat be kept. The position here is analogous to the position of the dietary laws, on Paul's analysis. Let people be aware, says Paul, that all foods (except, he has to add, those sacrificed to the Graeco-Roman idols) are licit. But let people additionally, he says, take care not to abuse their freedom, by taking decisions that give offence or scandal to ecclesial neighbours weak in their faith. As Paul considers the Kingdom to be "not about eating and drinking", so we may well here consider the Kingdom, imitating Paul, to be "not about the calendar". 
With a mandatory Saturday Shabbat off the table for the practical Catholic (what remains on the table is only an optional Saturday Shabbat - and what Catholic in Ontario is going to feel at all comfortable in taking the option of relaxing on Saturday, labouring on Sunday?), it might be thought that little remains for the Catholic seeking a Jewish life. Yet a central thing remains. The daily Catholic rhythm of prayer, outside Mass, has always been anchored in a Jewish rhythm known and understood in the (Roman) times of Yeshua ben-Yosef. As in the Judaism from the generations around Yeshua, so also perennially in Catholicism, pride of place is given to the Psalms, prayed in public under some canonically fixed daily schedule. In Post-Vatican II Catholicism, the Psalms are said under the headings of Laudes Matitutinae, Hora Tertia, Hora Sexta, Hora Nona, Hora Vespera, and Completorium, plus the time-flexible "Officium Lectionis"  - with, to be sure, suitable scriptural and patristic texts other than the Psalms, and with further prayers and hymns, rounding out this sevenfold liturgy.

It has to be conceded that there is no one Psalter schedule uniting our Catholic and Jewish traditions. Within Catholicism itself, moreover, a lack of uniformity already presents itself as decades and centuries pass. What is common now, under the Vatican II liturgical reforms, is a little different from the earlier twentieth-century practice. (In particular, the earlier practice was eightfold, and lacked the time-flexible "Officium Lectionis". I also think it allowed the earliest Office of one day to be said during the evening, or at least the pre-midnight dark hours, of the day before. I presume the sixth-century Psalm schedule of Saint Benedict, with its one-week eight-times-daily cycle (fully laid out in Benedict's Regula) was itself at variance with the two - the eightfold pre- and the sevenfold post-Vatican II - we know from our own time.)

These, however, are points of detail. What is central is that the Psalter becomes, both in Jewish traditions and in mutating Catholic traditions, a distinctively venerated and distinctively communal mode of prayer.

Now, I say: let us as Catholic laity, obliged in our living arrangements to pray privately (perhaps far from cathedrals and monasteries), continue working privately from our psalters. Optimally, that will mean  working from the Latin, so as to secure a measure of emotional emancipation from the silly dream-the-impossible-dream, Man-of-La-Mancha, cinema-and-television mindset that is perpetually threatening to snuff out our perpetually feeble prayer life. Working from the Latin is nowadays easy: one loads, for instance, http://www.universalis.com into smartphone or tablet or desktop in the usual English-only, and then one clicks on the bottom-of-browser hyperlink that says "You can also view this page in Latin and English."

And yet, I add, let us in the laity work, to the extent feasible for us, toward Hebraization, partially forsaking even such valuable resources as http://www.universalis.com (or else, perhaps, looking to the day when http://www.universalis.com starts sporting a new hyperlink: "You can also view this page in Latin and English, or as a further alternative in Latin and English, with Hebrew accompanying each piece of Vulgate-OT Latin"). Bit by bit, we may hope to replace one or another of our familiar Latin Psalm verses with Hebrew, at least in such private observations of the Office of the Hours as our work schedules and our state of endurance may permit.

The greatest of all the various services rendered by http://www.hebrew4christians.com is from my (Catholic) standpoint its making such a piecemeal lay-Catholic conversion away from Latin toward the Hebrew possible, by supplying tools - translation, text, and above all word-by-word, phrase-by-phrase commentary - at http://www.hebrew4christians.com/Scripture/Ketuvim/Psalms/psalms.html.

Two sets of practical questions do arise for the author of http://www.hebrew4christians.com. I will try to send them to him in e-mail this week. If he responds, I will try somehow see to it that his answers somehow get documented, within 48 hours, on this present blog:

  • How close are the pronunciations in the audio files reachable from http://www.hebrew4christians.com/Scripture/Ketuvim/Psalms/psalms.html to the current best philological understanding of ancient Hebrew phonetics? (I press this question in the awareness that modern spoken street Hebrew differs slightly from the philological understanding - with the (no-Daghesh) Dalet, for instance, hardened from the voiced-th, as in English "this", to "d" as in English "dome", and with Waw or Vav hardened from w-as-in-English-"wing" to v-as-in-English-"vote". The situation calls to mind the embarrassment that is Latin ecclesial pronunciation, with our Church unfortunately making several consonants Italianate, contrary to what is known to have been oratorical-best-practice in the Golden Period of pagan Latin literature: "Temperance wins out", or "temperantia vincit", is in Cicero's phonemes "tem - pe - RAN - tee- ah WIN -kit", and yet in ecclesial Latin becomes "tem - pe- RAN - tsee- ah VIN -tschit.") Further, what is Mr Parsons's, and his audio-file reader's, position on the difficult question of the letter Ayin - in classical Hebrew times pronounced as a true, albeit a subtle, guttural, and yet even in the careful Pratico-and-Van Pelt book recommended to be left silent, even as Aleph incontestably must be left silent? What is Mr Parsons's, and his audio-file reader's position on the Pathach vowel? (This, and Ayin, are the two main problems presently confronting me as I continue addressing phonetics. It is especially puzzling that Pratico and Van Pelt recommend pronouncing Pathach like the "a" in English "bat", and yet seem in the CD which accompanies their fine book to favour pronouncing Patach like the a in English "affair". - I am particularly anxious to get the phonetics right here when I reflect that the post-Roman Masoretes creating "pointing" - the vowel marks included - now present in all good printed Hebrew Bibles, exactly as a way of preserving the correct phonetics. Had they been blessed with such modern resources as the printing press, the International Phonetic Alphabet, and Internet servers with audio files, they would have used those tools too.) What is Mr Parsons's, and his audio-file reader's, position on the letter Qof? (I suspect that the Masoretes' Daghesh-hardened Kaf was in classical Hebrew times, in the pronunciation the post-classical Masoretes  sought to conserve, a bit lighter than Qof. This is the sort of thing that might make a good joke when someone comes round to my place for tea: "No, no, I don't have a cough [that is like Daghesh-hardened Kaf]; I have a Qof" (here one has to sound positively Arabic, taking the consonant WAY down deep, so that one's alarmed guest begins to wonder if one is about to don a keffiyeh, in a conceivable homage to Lawrence of Arabia). Finally, can Mr Parsons recommend to me some authority - some e-mail-contactable professor, in some such eminent place as Yale or Jerusalem, or alternatively some authoritative book - for Hebrew phonetics? Ideally, one would be able to work from some phonetics book equivalent to that authoritative analyst of Latin phonetics from the pagan Golden Period all the way into the (Italianate?) Dark Ages which is W. Sidney Allen's Vox Latina (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition 1989).
  • Can Mr Parsons recommend an analytical treatment of the Hebrew scriptures - at any rate a treatment that has each verb parsed to indicate stem, conjugation, person, gender, number, and root? (On the noun-pronoun-adjective side of things, analyses of Construct Chains would be reassuring also, and yet are less urgent than analytical support on verbs.) Here I am looking for a book paralleling, for Hebrew, Max Zerwick's and Mary Grosvener's Grammatical Analysis of the Greek New Testament (issued as an "Unabridged, Revised Edition in One Volume" in 1981 at the Biblical Institute Press in Rome). - Ideally, an analytical treatment would serve the reader rather as model answers serve in calculus: you work the problem on your own, keeping the answer key closed, but then you open the key to ascertain whether your solution was in fact correct. - My suspicion is that the answer to my question is "Nothing recent exists, and nothing (however far back we may go) exists for the entire Hebrew scriptures." At any rate all I have been able to find so far is a work of limited scope, from very far back indeed - Joana Julia Greswell's Grammatical Analysis of the Hebrew Psalter (Oxford: James Parker and Co., 1873; various download options are presented at https://archive.org/details/analysispsalter00gresuoft).

****

Before quite leaving Mr Parsons and proceeding to the third of my three theological shocks from 2017-07-02, I wish to comment in parenthetical, positive, terms on his philosophical interests. The interests are anchored not only in his attachment to theology but also in his training in formal logic (a subject which he has taught, I presume on some university or college campus).

Some of Mr Parsons's remarks on post-mediaeval philosophy suggest an approach to the subject similar to what I am trying to develop here on this present blog, in my ongoing multi-installment philosophy-of-perception-and-action essay. Like me, Mr Parsons deprecates approaches to perception that regard the perceiving subject as blocked by a wall of sense-data or sense-impressions from knowing the reality of physical objects.

Like me again, he defends a conception of objective truth. Here, for instance, is what he writes, in language which I could cheerfully make my own, at http://www.hebrew4christians.com/Holidays/Fall_Holidays/Elul/Metanoia/metanoia.html:

/.../ [G-d] made us so that we could discern truth about reality. The mind functions according to logical laws because it is made in the image and likeness of [G-d] Himself /.../ The Source of all truth is [G-d]. He is the Master of the Universe, the Lord of all possible outcomes and worlds. The heavens declare His glory (outer world) and human beings are made b'tzelem Elohim in His image (inner world).

****

The third of my 2017-07-02 theological shocks was my noting the 2010-11-11 upload of YouTube user "Micha'el Eliyahu BenDavid", under the title "SHEMA YISRAEL by Micha'el Ben David", to a length of 6:17. Micha'el Eliyahu Ben David is in fact a high-profile figure in contemporary Jewish music, born in 1951 and still active. So here, for once, is an accurate YouTube username. In my corner of the Web, Ben David's ("son-of-David's") material can be viewed under the URL https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9hdG1aXlExI.

With this musician today, as with his father's namesake royal Psalmist in the ancient Undivided Kingdom, theology gets brought to life. Ben David gives an overwhelming - so to speak, a total - expression, in a mixture of the Deuteronomic Hebrew and contemporary English, of truths in some way already hinted at by a 1916 or 1917 American mystic I have previously published on this blog. That previous publication is in a 2016-12-19 or 2016-12-20 posting headed "M.P.Montague: 'Twenty Minutes of Reality'", archived by the blogspot server as http://toomaskarmo.blogspot.ca/2016/12/mpmontague-twenty-minutes-of-reality.html. I would urge my readers this week to review Margaret Prescott Montague first, and then to turn to Ben David's YouTube performance. In so turning, they might seek out points of theological similarity.

With that pair of tasks accomplished, it may for some of my readers even prove appropriate to follow Mr Parsons in studying Hebrew - say, first and foremost through that theologically central Deuteronomic prayer which is the Shema, and later through selected Psalm fragments.

[This is the end of the current blog posting.]

Monday, 26 June 2017

Brian Kaller: The past Is a Foreign Country

[This essay was published on or around 2017-06-21 by Ireland-based journalist Brian Kaller, at http://restoringmayberry.blogspot.com/. It is reprinted here with the author's kind permission. Readers may wish also to look at two other pieces of writing touching on Mr Kaller's topic, both by USA-based blogger Brian Miller (and mentioned by Mr Miller in his blog comments at Mr Kaller's server space):


The owner of this present blog, Toomas Karmo, hopes to write some comments of his own here, developing a few of Mr Kaller's themes or a few of Mr Miller's themes, or a few of both, at some point in the next few weeks - perhaps as early as the first week in 2017 July.]


********

In the last few months I've been writing a lot about how our modern society differs from any traditional one, and not necessarily for the better. The phrase “traditional societies” covers a lot of ground, of course; basically, I’m defining it as life before we began using energy at the breakneck pace we are today. I mean the cultures that existed before roads became jammed with cars travelling at high speeds, before Hollywood media took over and replaced local culture, and before people in the modernised West began to spend their lives sitting in cars or staring at screens.

Those things didn’t all happen at once, or all together – as I argued a few weeks ago, 1950s America presents a well-studied intermediate case of a somewhat modernised country whose traditional culture was still vibrant and functioning. Ireland in the 1950s, meanwhile, still relied mostly on human and animal labour.
Dividing human societies into the traditional and the modern means making sweeping statements; obviously cavemen lived differently than Ancient Greeks, who lived differently than American pioneers, who lived differently than 20th century Irish. Of course I’m not saying that all traditional peoples lived the same way, or that any of them were wonderful and without tragedy – and of course some were horrific.

I am saying that, despite the superficial differences in language and dress, my elderly neighbours share some commonalities with all the generations who came before them, and -- despite the similarity in accents and dress --  are now culturally separated from their grandchildren in the same village.
Until recently, for example, few humans spent their lives travelling long distances, except for the occasional sailor or nomad. Even most foraging tribes generally travelled over a limited area, and farming people not at all. Like most traditional people, my Irish neighbours grew up tied to a place, knowing it as they knew themselves, and having a responsibility to keep it healthy for their grandchildren. Of course archaeology shows evidence of times and places when humans destroyed the land, often out of ignorance of what they were doing, but more often people lived in the same places for centuries or millennia, which they could not have done if they had not practiced a sustainable kind of management.
Until the last few generations, few people were rootless – even nomadic tribes circulated around a certain area during the year, and were tied to their family. Most modern people tell only the songs and stories manufactured for them by a faraway industry, but traditional people belonged to a landscape and a way of life, to a clan and larger people with their own stories and songs that told of their history. Even if they were poor, most people did not feel poverty as we might today, for their lives were not spend drifting through a sea of strangers.
When my neighbours told me of the history of their place, they described all the local families and their histories, stories of local lords and landowners, rebellions and tragedies – and this despite the land being devastated so often by famine and exodus. Memories don’t reach back so far in the USA, but in small towns here, you meet people who take a similar pride in the place where they belong.
The children in Ireland today have some of these relationships, but you can see it fading as they relate more to Youtube or the latest global teen fad than they do to elders in the same town. In the USA, where this process has been going on the longest, we think of it as normal – we expect that teenagers will relate to the media and not with their families. But most humans in history did not make the same assumptions about young people, and I have heard people from many parts of the world report the same erosion of their local identity.
Until our era people rarely used money, or needed to. Of course money did not exist in prehistoric days, the first 99.9 per cent of human existence, yet those humans traded with other tribes all the same. Even after the ancient Sumerians invented the first coins, though, few people used or even saw a coin even there, and of course most people on Earth were not in Sumeria. A medieval peasant might never have seen money or needed to use it either, they worked, of course, but to grow food and raise animals, like most humans in any time and place. The giant detour that our work makes – to work for someone else, to get pay, to put in a bank, to withdraw, to spend at stores, with governments and companies taking a cut out of every transaction – didn’t exist.
I'm not claiming they lived in an idyllic Eden; of course they could be terrorised by war or disease, but so can many people today --- Westerners have simply been shielded from these realities for a few generations. Keep in mind, also, that medieval peasants might have worked far fewer hours every week than we do. Also, keep in mind that their work was necessary and meaningful, and often done together as a family – it was time spent with the family, not away from it.
Also, I’m not just comparing our modern world with prehistoric or medieval life, with no spectrum in between. My elderly neighbours here, growing up in Ireland in the 1930s, 40s and 50s, would have had money and used it, and even started their own business enterprises at young ages to get pocket money to spend. Those gave them treats, though; most of what they needed they knew how to produce for themselves. Some tell me they didn’t need to use money more than once a week, and that was small amounts from a hiding place.
To give you an idea of how little they needed money, Ireland in the 1970s saw a bank strike that lasted over a year – across the country, no one could withdraw money for more than a year. Of course, some people used a village credit union, or used the post office as a bank, as Irish people do today. Nonetheless, most people’s money was in banks, no one could withdraw for months, and yet life carried on as normal.
You can even see this to some extent in America in the 1950s and 60s – again, a world further along the spectrum to ours, but still less dependent than we are on a constant money stream. Banks then had tellers, not automatic cash machines, and most people visited them once or twice a week. People went shopping less, and instead of the dizzying number of products our stores carry, shops had staples that people used for cooking, or simple clothes that were more durable. ATMs didn’t exist, but people didn’t need them.
In every society that I know of – except our modern one -- children learned from parents and older relatives, and stayed close to their families until they came of age. In most of those children accompanied their parents as they hunted, ploughed, washed clothes, cooked food and all the other necessities of life, and learned the skills they needed to be adults. Children in more recent centuries went to schools, as my elderly neighbours did, but most countries children could walk to school, were taught by local people who were also part of the community. Most did not do what parents often do today, to send their children away to giant cement compounds to be raised by strangers.
In early America, for that matter, school took fewer hours of the day and fewer days of the year. They did not experience what modern children do, of being warehoused for 20,000 hours of their formative years. Yet many of those schools taught students far more, at earlier ages, than under our giant bureaucracies. If you want to see the level of education that many rural children received, read the letters of Civil War soldiers conscripted from homesteads. Or keep in mind that the Lincoln-Douglas debates, whose complex sentences often flummox college students today, were meant to be listened to, not read, and by simple farmers.
Until our modern society came along, no people shut their elders away in nursing homes, rarely seen by children and grandchildren and with only other dying people for company. In most traditional cultures elderly members of a family lived with their children or relatives, and most religions had some variation of the fourth commandment to honour one’s father and mother. Elders, though weakened in body, had a lifetime of experience that younger generations needed, whether in raising children, dealing with neighbours or handling emergencies. From a position of respect they could pass on the songs and stories of their people, giving children an umbilical link to the generations who came before.
We see the same pattern in other animals with some intelligence and family life; elephants, for example, need the elder members of the herd to keep the younger ones in line and show them how to deal with threats. When park rangers in South Africa introduced young elephants to a new preserve, after the older members of the herd had been killed, they found the young animals made unwise decisions for decades, only slowly learning, through trial and error, the right way to live. For generations many people in America today have grown up in the same situation, without elders to guide them through their lives, until we now have a population of children in adult bodies.
Just as most traditional peoples did not spend their work hours staring at a glowing rectangle, so they did not spend their leisure the same way. Children had games that were passed down for centuries – blind-man’s bluff and Johnny jump-up – that are only now disappearing in an age of video-games. Elders sang songs that told people who they were as a people, told stories of love and loss, of heroes and maidens, tragedy and humour and the human condition. My neighbours grew up with families visiting each other at night, gathering with the local storytellers and musicians, listening to the tales and singing along to folk songs they all knew, which had been passed down through the generations.
The modern era has changed our friendships as well; almost any humans in history, whether prehistoric tribes or medieval farmers, Hebrew herdsmen or American pioneers, dealt with a community of people outside their family who lived nearby, and had to maintain good relations with them. Small-town people, whether here or in the USA, retain some of this attitude even today; they have to know their neighbours and help out occasionally, as they might need help themselves.
You see the difference in the way my neighbours treat death with the way modern urban people do. When I lived in the modern city and a neighbour died, we found out when an ambulance parked outside, or a new couple moved in where the old lady used to live. Out here in rural Ireland, a neighbour’s death meant girls at the local school without a father, an empty chair at the pub, a voice missing from the hymns at church, a hole in people’s lives.
Such relationships soften our reactions to conflict; the person waiting in line ahead of us might have taken First Communion with us, and might have scored the winning goal in the school’s football match long ago, and might have a tractor we need in case a tree falls over the only road. Again, the details would change from one culture to the next, but every human society would have a web of debt and obligation like this, to temper our reactions to conflict and force us to see other people’s views. Enough threads like that, woven together, form a civilised society.
Only in the modern era, for most Westerners today, do “friends” largely mean icons on a screen, whose relationship with you consists of moving electrons around. Today we can “meet,” have “conversations,” “share” news, and even “date,” all without ever having to deal with the inhibiting presence of other humans. We can do these things under fake names and pictures, talking to people we will never meet in person, and say or do whatever we want without fear of consequences. People can appear and disappear from our lives, all without leaving any tangible presence, fading like ghosts when bored. 
The modern world has many advantages; until the last century food could be scarce, and even in good years it cost labour and sacrifice. At the same time, until the last century no humans ate food that had been flown across the world, packaged in chemical gases to preserve it and simulate a healthy colour. No humans ate food injected with other chemicals to make it more addictive. Instead, traditional people ate foods they knew, and had picked out of the ground or off a tree. Foods belonged to certain seasons, and tasted like a time and place. Meat came from an animal, hunted or herded, that had just been killed, unless it was salted and smoked. People recognised their food as precious and its sharing as sacred, the stuff of religious ritual.
Until ours came along, all human societies had rites of passage to mark when a girl became a woman, and when a boy had proven himself a man. Becoming a young man or maiden – what we today call a “teen” -- did not mean that they would spend more hours warehoused in an institution, or spend their time with gangs of other teenagers in places of maximum temptation; rather, it meant taking on more of the responsibilities of adulthood, preferably with older family and mentors to guide them.
Again, a childhood among the Bushmen or the Vikings would be very different from each other, and both would be very different than American pioneer children or mid-20th-century Irish. Each of these eras had injustice, disease and starvation, just as ours does. My point is that we are not sealed in a culture of driving and staring at screens, with all its advantages and disadvantages in a single package.

The past, with all its possibilities, is still there. We know what more traditional people did well that we do not. We can still grow, cook and preserve food without electricity, play the games and tell the stories that our forebears did, and sing the songs that told of their loves and tragedies. We can learn from the elders who remember these things, before the last of them disappear and the past becomes an utterly foreign country to us. 
[This is the end of the current blog posting.]

Toomas Karmo (Part F): Philosophy of Perception, Action, and "Subjectivity"

Quality assessment:



On the 5-point scale current in Estonia, and surely in nearby nations, and familiar to observers of the academic arrangements of the late, unlamented, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (applying the easy and lax standards Kmo deploys in his grubby imaginary "Aleksandr Stepanovitsh Popovi nimeline sangarliku raadio instituut" (the "Alexandr Stepanovitch Popov Institute of Heroic Radio") and his  grubby imaginary "Nikolai Ivanovitsh Lobatshevski nimeline sotsalitsliku matemaatika instituut" (the "Nicolai Ivanovich Lobachevsky Institute of Socialist Mathematics") - where, on the lax and easy grading philosophy of the twin Institutes, 1/5 is "epic fail", 2/5 is "failure not so disastrous as to be epic", 3/5 is "mediocre pass", 4/5 is "good", and 5/5 is "excellent"): 4/5. Justification: There was enough time to write out the  necessary points to reasonable length.


Revision history:


All times in these blog "revision histories" are stated in UTC (Universal Coordinated Time/ Temps Uniersel Coordoné,  a precisification of the old GMT, or "Greenwich Mean Time"), in the ISO-prescribed YYYYMMDDThhmmZ timestamping format. UTC currently leads Toronto civil time by 4 hours and currently lags Tallinn civil time by 3 hours.

20170627T0001Z/version 1.0.0: Kmo uploaded a not-quite polished version. His writing incorporated two recycled paragraphs from an earlier posting, as documented in the revision history for the "Part D" posting of this present philosophy-of-perception-and-action essay (2017-06-05/2017-06-06). He reserved the right to make tiny, nonsubstantive, purely cosmetic tweaks over the coming 48 hours, as here-undocumented versions 1.0.1, 1.0.2, 1.0.3, ... .]



[CAUTION: A bug in the blogger server-side software has in some past weeks shown a propensity to insert inappropriate whitespace at some points in some of my posted essays. If a screen seems to end in empty space, keep scrolling down. The end of the posting is not reached until the usual blogger "Posted by Toomas (Tom) Karmo at" appears. - The blogger software has also shown a propensity to generate HTML that gets formatted in different ways on different client-side browsers, perhaps with some browsers not correctly reading in the entirety of the "Cascading Style Sheets"  (CSS) which on all ordinary Web servers control the browser placement of margins, sidebars, and the like. If you suspect CSS problems in your particular browser, be patient: it is probable that while some content has been shoved into some odd place (for instance, down to the bottom of your browser, where it ought to appear in the right-hand margin), all the server content has been pushed down into your browser in some place or other. - Finally, there may be blogger vagaries, outside my control, in font sizing or interlinear spacing. - Anyone inclined to help with trouble-shooting, or to offer other kinds of technical advice, is welcome to write me via Toomas.Karmo@gmail.com.]


In this sixth ("Part F") installment of what might ultimately prove a 10- or 15- or 20-installment essay on the analytical philosophy of perception and action, I am still finishing off some preliminaries. In my third installment ("Part C", from 2017-05-29 or 2017-05-30), I wrote that I am presupposing a position on causation contrary to the position of a possible philosopher DEFGH (*"Darren Gloom" or "Dagwood Spume"). In my fourth installment ("Part D", from 2017-06-05 or 2017-06-06, I wrote that I am presupposing a position on other minds contrary to the position of a possible philosopher HGFED.

It might at this point be objected: Fine, then. In ordinary speech, "cause" and its cognates carry a meaning incompatible with the semantics proposed by DEFGH, and "aware" and its cognates carry a meaning incompatible with the semantics proposed by HGFED. But this is a mere sociological fact, regarding contingent linguistic habits in Homo sapiens. A deeper question remains unaddressed by such sociological observations. Deeper is the question what meanings ought to be attached to "cause" (and cognates), and to "aware" (and cognates). Could it be that common language tries in a confused and obfuscatory way to use meanings to which it lacks entitlement - even as the pre-Victorian physicists used a meaning to which they lacked entitlement when they  in their obfuscation wrote of heat as "Caloric Fluid"?

A mathematical parallel helps reinforce this parallel from physics. The question of underlying entitlement is analogous to questions which (so I vaguely gather) have been posed by a particular school or grouping in the philosophy of mathematics. In the case of mathematics, I shall have now to depart in a small way from my Igominy and Humiligation Precept, openly naming three names. The workers in question are the "intuitionists", in the Netherlands, along with a Russian "ultra-finitist". (I have not to any significant extent read in these authors.) In the Netherlands was a movement led by Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer (1881-1966) and Arend Heyting (1899-1980). In Russia (with later a period of American exile) was Alexander Sergeyevich Esenin-Volpin (more formally Александр Сергеевич Есенин-Вольпин; 1924-2016).

The revisionist philosophers of mathematics represent themselves as rejecting a traditionally "Platonic" conception of mathematics. The general flavour of their position is illustrated by an anecdote regarding A.S. Essenin-Volpin. The story goes somewhat as follows (I embellish slightly, for clarity: 

A mathematician of a traditionalist disposition - (call her, or him, "Professeur Platonique") fond of the "actually infinite set, of cardinality aleph-null, which is the positive integers" - asks Essenin-Volpin, "Does reality contain such an entity as the integer 1?" Essenin-Volpin replies, after some short time interval Delta-t (we might imagine this being 125 or 250 or 500 milliseconds, or so): Yes. 

"And does reality contain such an entity as the integer 2?" Essenin-Volpin pauses just a little longer, in fact 2*2 = 4 times as long as Delta-t, before saying "Yes."

"And does reality contain such an entity as the integer 3?" Essenin-Volpin pauses a little longer still, in fact 2*2*2 = 8 times as long as Delta-t, before saying "Yes."  

And does reality contain such an entity as the integer 4? Essenin-Volpin pauses rather perceptibly, in fact for an interval 2*2*2*2 = 16 times as long as Delta-t, before saying "Yes." 

The general flavour of their position can also be conveyed by remarking that some of them formalized what was and was not admissible in their prescribed day-to-day mathematical practice. (Here I write "some" to signal the fact that Brouwer, in contrast with Heyting, eschewed formal metamathematics.) I gather that you were not allowed to assert that for every mathematical proposition p, either p or not-p. In fact, as I (dimly) understand it, you were only allowed to assert "either p or not-p" in cases in which you somehow could show that either a proof of p could be written or a proof of the impossibility of ever proving p could be written. (Here, I presume, the potentially troublesome conception of "writing a proof" itself got duly formalized.) 

In general, we have no guarantee that (given, I presume, a reasonable formalization of the informal locution "writing a proof") for every mathematical proposition p, either we can write a proof of p or we can write a proof of the impossibility of writing a proof of p

One real-life example - I have, even in my ignorance, to do my best to construct a real-life example - might be the series representation of Euler's number e = 2.71828182845904523536028747135... . This number is the base of the natural logarithms. It is notorious, like pi, for being not merely irrational as the square root of 2 is irrational, but for additionally lacking any finite algebraic representation such as "the unique positive real number x such that x*x = 2". 

In classical mathematics, as I presume rejected by the revisionists, e is the limit of the series  1 + 1 + 1/2 + 1/6 + 1/24 + 1/120 + ...  - more tidily, of the series 1/0! + 1/1! + 1/2! + 1/3! + 1/4! + 1/5! + ... . No finite initial segment (no "partial sum") from the series equals e. Nevertheless, from a classical-mathematics perspective, for any positive real number epsilon, no matter how excruciatingly small, there exists some (perhaps dauntingly large) number N such that the sum of the first N terms in the series (the "N-term partial sum") falls short of e by some quantity even smaller than epsilon. 

Let, now, p be the following proposition: For some sum-of-the-first-N-terms approximation "falls-Nshort" of e from the just-mentioned finite series, falls-Nshort contains, somewhere in its ordinary decimal expansion, the pre-2006 Toronto phone number of the author of this blog (namely 4169716955). 

If p is true, we might be able to prove it true, say by running a computer, and computing the 100,000-term approximation falls-100,000short of e, and expressing that approximation as some decimal, and taking lots of computer printout. It can be shown - at any rate, I have in my ignorance to say, in the framework of classical, pre-Brouwer, mathematics - that the computer result will be either a decimal expansion tidily ending in repeated 0, as for 1/25 = 0.0400000000..., or a decimal expansion tidily repeating with something other than mere "0000...", as in the case of 1/11 = 0.0909090909... So for any N, we can satisfy ourselves that we have grasped the result for N by taking some finite (perhaps prolix) printout, and finding the eventual, inevitable, onset-of-boredom stage beyond which things just repeat. We will have proved the truth of p once we have found, upon combing through some (suitably prolix, and yet finite) printout from the decimal representation of falls100,000short, the string 4169716955. We will have proved the truth of p if we find, for example,  2.7182818284590452353602874713 ... [and three thousand further unhelpful digits] 841697169559 [and ten thousand further digits in this particular prolix pile of printout - and yet, in our joy, we need not bother inspecting that further ten thousand]. 

But what if we search for a proof that p and fail? We can only perform a finite number of searches, even though each individual search, that is to say each falls-Nshort, for some N in the set {1, 2, 3, ... }, need only be printed out to some finite number of pages. It may well be that there is no way of proving that all possible searches for a proof that p are doomed to fail. The index N at any rate is - alas - unbounded. 

To reiterate: (1) according to this revisionist movement in the philosophy of mathematics, if we lack a proof that p, and also lack a proof that all possible attempts at a proof that p will fail, we cannot assert that either p or not p; and (2) I have tried tonight to supply a plausible candidate "p". 

****

It has already proved advisable to violate the guiding Igominy and Humiligation Precept from 2017-05-22 or 2017-05-23 ("Part B") by mentioning Brouwer, Heyting, and Essenin-Volpin. Now it is advisable for me to violate it again by citing, albeit tersely, the work of Catholic British logician-philosopher Prof. Sir Michael Dummett (1925-2011). 

Dummett, terming the just-described movement "anti-realism in the philosophy of mathematics", asserts anti-realism in mathematics to have potential parallels in other areas of philosophy. Dummett would say that DEFGH is working toward articulating "anti-realism" (not in the philosophy of mathematics, but) in the "philosophy of causation". Dummett would say that HGFED is working toward articulating "anti-realism" (not in the philosophy of mathematics, but) in the "philosophy of other minds". 

I for my part would rephrase this a little, representing Dummett as posing questions of entitlement. Our actual linguistic practice concerning causation and Other Minds, which I have tried to analyze over my last three postings by looking at such things as support-for-counterfactuals, is at variance with the practice of my hypothesized investigators DEFGH and HGFED. Dummett's question (on my formulation) is this: Is our actual linguistic practice legitimate - is it a linguistic practice to which we are entitled? Could it be that it is in some sense incoherent (confused), like the old 18th-century physical-science language of "Caloric Fluid"? 

Here I come to the limits of what I can do. I am like one of those 1950s Oxford linguistic philosophers who analyzed current semantic practice without pressing downward to Dummett's underlying question of entitlement. (I recall that one of the Surface Swimmers was called Jane Austin, or Jock Austen, or something. I recall the name of another coming up as the first in a trio of dropped names in that wonderful play a mathematician wrote and staged at Monash University in Melbourne, in 1978. (I became for our playwright a subtly mendacious café waiter from Knossos, sporting a Cretan accent - "See my passport, BIRTHPLACE: Knossos.") A melancholy guitarist in this café (at the "Paradox Hotel") professes his disdain for "a drama shared with all Creation", declaiming his countervailing preference for "Philosophical Investigation": Sometimes I while/ Away my time with Ryle;/ Next I incline/ To Wittgenstein/ Or even Quine. One must imagine the lines spoken while the so-sad guitar emits a plink and a plonk. - I like to think that the actor in this particular role had been selected in part for his marked air of melancholy, in part also for his robustly Australian phonemes.)

Tonight I simply have to put on record my assumption that yes, we are entitled to our current practice, both as regards causation and as regards the existence of other minds. Surface-skimming? Yes, alas. Let this admission constitute the hoisting of a formal "superficiality flag", within the meaning of the Debian Precept as promulgated on 2017-05-22 or 2017-05-23, in "Part B" of this essay.]


[This is the end of the current blog posting, as "Part F" of the philosophy-of-perception-and-action essay. It is hoped to upload "Part G" at some point in the coming four weeks, perhaps as early as next week or the week following.] 

Monday, 19 June 2017

Toomas Karmo (Part E): Philosophy of Perception, Action, and "Subjectivity"

Quality assessment:


On the 5-point scale current in Estonia, and surely in nearby nations, and familiar to observers of the academic arrangements of the late, unlamented, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (applying the easy and lax standards Kmo deploys in his grubby imaginary "Aleksandr Stepanovitsh Popovi nimeline sangarliku raadio instituut" (the "Alexandr Stepanovitch Popov Institute of Heroic Radio") and his  grubby imaginary "Nikolai Ivanovitsh Lobatshevski nimeline sotsalitsliku matemaatika instituut" (the "Nicolai Ivanovich Lobachevsky Institute of Socialist Mathematics") - where, on the lax and easy grading philosophy of the twin Institutes, 1/5 is "epic fail", 2/5 is "failure not so disastrous as to be epic", 3/5 is "mediocre pass", 4/5 is "good", and 5/5 is "excellent"): 4/5. Justification: There was enough time to write out the  necessary points to reasonable length. 


Revision history:


  • 20170620T0001Z/version 1.0.0: Kmo was able to upload a fairly polished version. He reserved the right to make tiny, nonsubstantive, purely cosmetic, tweaks over the coming 48 hours, as here-undocumented versions 1.0.1, 1.0.2, 1.0.3, ... .  


[CAUTION: A bug in the blogger server-side software has in some past weeks shown a propensity to insert inappropriate whitespace at some points in some of my posted essays. If a screen seems to end in empty space, keep scrolling down. The end of the posting is not reached until the usual blogger "Posted by Toomas (Tom) Karmo at" appears. - The blogger software has also shown a propensity to generate HTML that gets formatted in different ways on different client-side browsers, perhaps with some browsers not correctly reading in the entirety of the "Cascading Style Sheets"  (CSS) which on all ordinary Web servers control the browser placement of margins, sidebars, and the like. If you suspect CSS problems in your particular browser, be patient: it is probable that while some content has been shoved into some odd place (for instance, down to the bottom of your browser, where it ought to appear in the right-hand margin), all the server content has been pushed down into your browser in some place or other. - Finally, there may be blogger vagaries, outside my control, in font sizing or interlinear spacing. - Anyone inclined to help with trouble-shooting, or to offer other kinds of technical advice, is welcome to write me via Toomas.Karmo@gmail.com.]


First, an administrative preliminary: I have had to change the previous posting in this (philosophy-of-perception-and-action) series. That was the posting from 2017-06-05 or 2017-06-06, under the heading "Part D". On reflection this week, I find I have to rip out my last two paragraphs. It is not that those paragraphs are untrue. Rather, they are premature, given what I this week realize to be the overall necessary flow of exposition - an exposition requiring, as noted in my "Part C" (2017-05-29 or 2017-05-30) and "Part D" (2017-06-05 or 2017-06-06), first working on some foundational points. I still have to take us through some foundational or prefatory material, being unable as yet to wade boldly into my official topics of perception and action. Worse, within the preliminary, and now rather protracted, foundational work, the two paragraphs just referred to got written a bit too early, and so have for the moment to be chopped out. 

The pair of premature paragraphs should be resurfacing rather soon, perhaps in the next week or so, as the preliminaries get padded out and finished off and tied up. For the moment, I have recorded my embarrassing excision (quoting what I excised from normal-font body text) in the small-font "Revision History", at the top of the now-shortened 2017-06-05 or 2017-06-06 posting. 

****

With the required amputation performed, the previous ("Part D", 2017-06-05 or 2017-06-06) posting ends simply as follows:

On one of the various possible outrageous Other-Minds parallels to the outrageous Intermittent Furniture and the outrageous Young Universe hypotheses, if I had, counterfactually, asked the sales clerk and the other customer not about pepperoni sticks but about - for example -  east African railways, they would have said the same things, thereupon giving them the air of mere robots playing back mere canned phonemes:

    ME, TO OTHER CUSTOMER: Sir, are you aware that Nairobi
    now has a thrice-weekly service to Mombasa?

    LADY AT CASH, TO ME: I already put your pepperoni sticks into the bag.

    CUSTOMER, TO ME: Yes, these two are my pepperoni sticks.

    ME: I am talking about this year's Nairobi-Mombasa railway launch,
    not about pepperoni, you doofus.

    CUSTOMER TO ME: The same thing.

****

As I suggested back on 2017-06-05 or 2017-06-06, it is a supposition consistent with all your actual observations that you (the reader) are within the species Homo sapiens the sole possessor of awareness, with all other humans mere mindless, walking and gesticulating, sleepwalkers. My little story from back then, just now reproduced, is a story on which if you were to have said things to your fellow humans other than the many things you have in fact over the course of your life said to them, those humans would have taken on the distressing aspect of mere gramophones, emitting mere canned phonemes. Now I have to look at this general kind of scenario a little further, as I unfortunately neglected to do on 2017-06-05/2017-06-06. 

In so looking, I have to confess a feeling of unease. I have, alas, not only to articulate a position more fully than hitherto, but also to put on public record my worry that my now-more-adequately articulated position may prove, in some way that I cannot now see, inadequate. 

****

Consider, once again, the 2017-06-05/2017-06-06 robot. 

Suppose first (as "Supposition One") that the cosmos really is rich in causal connections, of the kind affirmed by common sense. In terms of my "Part C" from 2016-05-29/2016-05-30, this is the common-sense supposition that various events do really make other events happen, and that therefore it is FALSE that (to reproduce language from "Part C") for every event E2 supposedly caused by some event E1, E2 would have happened even if E1 had failed to happen. On this "Supposition One", counterfactuals are abundantly supported. To give two common-sense examples: 
  • Had the airship Hindenburg been, counterfactually, filled with helium rather than with hydrogen, the 1937-05-06 explosion which in fact traumatized Lakewood, New Jersey, would not have occurred. 
  • Were the Sun's photosphere to have, counterfactually, a temperature of a mere 100 Kelvins, there would, contrary to observed fact, be no liquid water on Earth. 
Additionally, suppose (as "Supposition Two") that the robot from our "Part D", 2017-06-05/2017-06-06, discussion is so well designed as to render socially plausible not only the conversation you in fact have had with it, but all the alternative conversations you could, counterfactually, have had with it. In that previous ("Part D", 2017-06-05/2017-06-06) discussion I imagined (regretably making things too easy for myself) a counterfactual change in the conversational scenario, exposing the robot as a mere parroter of canned phonemes: 

ROBOT [smiling}: Hi, how are you?

YOU:  Fine, thanks. What is your name?

ROBOT [smile now fading]: Well, yes, this can be depressing.
But I have been getting psychotherapy.

YOU: Don't tell me about psychotherapy: please tell me your name.

ROBOT: I see a lady in private practice.

YOU: "I see a lady in private practice" is not a name.

ROBOT: Oh, on the other side of the Charles River, in Boston.

YOU: That isn't a name either, you doofus.

ROBOT [with a slight narrowing of the gaze, appropriate for the communication ofjuicy social gossip]: Well, as I was explaining just last week to a fine old local family when I got wheeled out to Hyannis Port after psychotherapy, regional accents sound contrived - affected, even - when robots use them.

[and so on]


This week, by contrast, I am imagining not only the entire actual conversation being socially plausible (it started off - to recapitulate - with banter about regional English accents, and morphed into bantering reminiscences of the ancient Rowan-and-Martin television show), but more radically am imagining that any other line of conversation WOULD have proved equally plausible HAD we (counterfactually) ventured on it. So had we, contrary to fact, asked the robot, "What is your name?" things would (so I am imagining this week, in a for-once-properly-radical spirit) have gone on just fine: 

 ROBOT: [smiling]: Hi, how are you?

YOU:   Fine, thanks. What is your name?

ROBOT: Would you like my originally given name, or the appellation that I have now taken as my Name in Religion?

YOU:   Gee whiz, don't tell me you are in Religion?

ROBOT: Well, I must not exaggerate. I am only a Tertiary.

YOU:   You mean, like a Franciscan or Dominican teriary?

ROBOT: Close. I'm a Benedictine Oblate.

YOU [with some irritation]: Oh fine, then. First tell me your originally given name, then your Name in Religion.

ROBOT [frowning slightly, then brightening]: When they first plugged me in here at MIT, I got called Klankton Polymer. But on affiliating myself with the Benedictines at the Archabbey of Saint Vincent in LaTrobe, Pennsylvania, where some nice Opus Dei guys so obligingly carted me in the Opus Dei cube van, I became... oh... er... um...

YOU:   You became what? Don't er and um and prevaricate like that, or I shall begin questioning the reality of mind behind vinyl.

ROBOT [now beaming broadly]: Groccor Buastonius Loquacissimus

YOU:   That's hardly a suitably Benedictine Name-in-Religion. In Benedictine life, one is supposed to become "Willibald" or "Wunibald", or something.  Or maybe "Ansgar".

ROBOT: Well, that's what I said to the Abbot, you know. But he was obdurate ... this was under the rule of the Panzer Pope, you know.... I mean, ai-ai-ai and VOTT can I say? When the Abott goes "Groccor Buastonius" I'm like, totally, Oy vey zmir, oy vey gevalt already - know what I mean?

[and so on]

Under this pair of suppositions, with Supposition One following untutored common sense but Supposition Two radical, is there any longer any logically coherent possibility of doubting that there is a "mind behind the vinyl"? 

****

Well, in my readiness to duck slings, arrows, and rotten tomatoes, I herewith go on public record as believing that yes, logical room for manoeuvre remains. (At least, I stress, until someone instructs me to the contrary - and being (I stress) admittedly unsure of myself, in these so-dense conceptual thickets.) Even here, I think (tentatively, I stress; being  less than sure, I stress) there remains the logical possibility that no mind is present. I am suggesting, that is, that even on this week's radical supposition regarding the robot's counterfactual capabilities, the meaning our language attaches to the term "mind" is such as to render the no-mind-is-present supposition logically coherent. 

To reiterate this key thesis, in a varying of terminology: although (I) the meaning our ordinary, common, English language attaches to "triangle" is such as to render the supposition of drawing a four-sided triangle logically incoherent, and although the meaning our ordinary, common, English language attaches to "bachelor" is such as to render the suggestion of meeting a married bachelor logically incoherent, nevertheless (II) such is the meaning our ordinary, common English language attaches to "mind" that the supposition of a mindless machine passing not only (as in my writing from the night of 2017-06-05/2017-06-06) all actual but (as in my writing tonight) all counterfactual social-conversation tests is logically coherent. 

Indeed, I suggest, the very supposition that all humans other than you, the reader, are eloquent sleepwalkers lacking awareness, despite their passing all actual AND counterfactual social-conversation tests, is logically coherent. 

I look at it in the same way as I look at the supposition that those wicker chairs and that mirror-topped coffee table exist only when inspected (from installment "C" of this essay, on 2017-05-29/2017-05-30). The meanings, I insisted back in installment "C", which ordinary human language attaches to "wicker chair" and "mirror-topped coffee table" are such as to make the outrageous supposition logically coherent, even when we build it up counterfactually: The wicker chairs and glass-topped coffee table exist when and only when inspected, in the sense that for every time t at which nobody is looking into my parlour both (a) the parlour is empty of furniture at t and (b) WERE, counterfactually, some observer x to be looking into the parlour at t, x WOULD in that counterfactual situation find two wicker chairs and a mirror-topped coffee table. 

(I should, to be sure, have written this point more clearly back on 2017-05-29/2017-05-30; I omitted to spell out the importance of considering both categoricals and counterfactual hypotheticals.)

My point is thus that there presently seems to me (I do stress my unease and uncertainty, as I struggle with dense thickets) no reason for treating the existence or nonexistence of Other Minds differently, so far as the space of logically coherent possibilities runs, from the existence or nonexistence of Uninspected Furniture. 

****

It must be conceded that our discussion is somewhat bedevilled by the primitive state of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and robotics. 

Here is a marvel before us - a housefly, a buzzing little specimen of Musca domestica, hairy in leg, loud in wing, and bulbous-red in compound eye. As we approach the fly, it takes flight from its bookshelf perch, only to land on a piece of our lunchtime cheese, four metres away. We stride in stealthy irritation toward the now-immobile creature, alarmed by an all-too-plausible imaginative vision of microbes lodged in leg hairs. The creature remains immobile until the very instant of our trying to detain it, beneath outstretched, slowly and quietly descending, palm. In the last possible hundred milliseconds, it cunningly eludes our ambush, now soaring, now diving, now soaring again - tracing first some geometrically easy plane curve, and then venturing, Spitfire-like, along the space curves which are the proper province not of univariate but of multivariate calculus. As we turn away for a moment, the unwelcome forager is back at our Monterrey Jack, proboscis now insolently extended onto the appetizing creamy-yellow surface. 

Can AI labs create anything like this - even, perhaps, as robots confined to the mathematically easy two-dimensional space of a lab floor, rather than flying about in three-space? I am agnostic. Perhaps the feat still eludes roboticists. Perhaps, on the other hand, it has somehow been accomplished, in some such leading-edge school as MIT. If possible at all, the feat must at any rate lie on the leading edge of what is currently possible. 

When it comes to robot conversation, the labs are (surely) nowhere near success. Although I am happy to be advised to the contrary, I suspect things now to differ in degree only, and not in kind, from the ELIZA psychiatrist-simulators that were amusing everyone a generation ago:  

The year is 1982 or 1983. I have become the proud owner of an Osborne 1, for a mere four or five or six weeks' pay. Here is a marvel before our eyes - an 8-bit CPU addressing 64 kilobytes of RAM! And the absence of a hard drive is amply compensated not by the presence not of one but of two floppy drives, each capable of delivering perhaps around one hundred kilobytes! 

I am showing off the "machine", as one in that era so loftily calls it, to a friend, "VUWX", from the Ukrainian diaspora, with his lady companion. As I expatiate on the "machine's"  "word processor" and its "spreadsheet", VUWX assures me that gee, he is sure glad this is not boring. 

Then, however, I launch the LISP-coded ELIZA simulator. It purports to be a robot psychiatrist. 

TELL ME ABOUT YOURSELF, says ELIZA, via the tiny CRT screen (not 80 but a mere 52 characters wide - this particular Osborne 1, an early model within Dr Adam Osborne's full production run, forces its operators into lots of horizontal scrolling). My friend VUWX types in response I AM UKRAINIAN. There is now a prolonged pause, amounting to perhaps around 30 seconds, as the valiant little 8-bit CPU chugs and chugs, processing its troubling, putatively mental-patient, input. Finally its output appears, in those tiny glowing CRT letters: HOW DO YOU SUPPOSE YOU GOT TO BE UKRAINIAN? 

Nobody now has, any more than anyone in 1982 did have, any idea how to design a robot to handle the full categorical-and-counterfactual gamut of conceivable social-conversation tests, of the kind partly sketched on this blog in the evening or night of 2017-06-05/2017-06-06 and more carefully (adding duly robust counterfactuals) sketched tonight. 

Whether it is possible in principle for engineers in Homo sapiens to design such a robot, I do not know. 

(1) One possibility is that yes, it could somehow be done, perhaps upon acquiring a bits-and-bytes-level understanding of the Homo sapiens brain. (This would be an understanding dimly akin to, and yet orders upon orders of magnitude more elaborate than, the understanding molecular-biology researchers claim to have of the DNA genetic code.) 

(2) A different possibility is that it could not be done without a kind of cheating - by taking a living, functioning Homo sapiens brain, and without understanding at bits-or-bytes level what the individual neurons are doing, simply reproducing its myriad possible information flows in electronics, bit for bit or byte for byte. It would be somewhat like cheating on a physics exam: when Bertie Balky copies that differential equation from his examination-hall neighbour Alice Astute, he does not really understand the Free Harmonic Oscillator, much though he may wish his professor to think he understands. 

(3) A still different possibility is that it could not be done at all - thanks to the absence, in mere robotic electronics, of a "Soul". 

The "Soul" can be something of a Catholic superstition. One winces just a little upon reading, in the twenty-second chapter of Gordon Thomas's and Max Morgan-Witts's gripping history Pontiff (Granada, 1983, on the three 1978-era pontificates) the following: 

The Camerlengo is faced with a ticklish problem. His question /.../ about when the pope died is linked to Absolution, the granting of the forgiveness of sins. The much-debated theological point is how long after death may total Absolution be granted. It revolves around the vexing question of how durable a soul can be. There are some Catholics who argue that if a Catholic succumbs following a long wasting illness, cancer for example, the soul might leave the body relatively quickly, possibly within thirty minutes of death. But if a person has been healthy before being fatally struck down, his soul could remain in the body three or four hours, perhaps even longer. To non-Catholics the proposition may appear fanciful, but it can afford great comfort to Catholics.

Still, what can be said for sure? Perhaps, for all that is currently  known, it is impossible in principle to endow a robot with awareness, since a "Soul" is lacking. 

I am of course liable here to attract, once again, a derisory shower of slings, arrows, and decaying veggies. But do consider what we find in secular writers, not promoting  specially Catholic agendas. I recall the account of a naturalist who befriended a number of wolves, I think keeping them in a kind of enclosure - in a kind of paddock, perhaps - close to his house. At the instant the ailing wolf-master died, his pack was observed to burst into a howl, physically isolated though they were from the deathbed. - Well, "was observed" provided, to be sure, that the now-forgotten author I was reading, perhaps from some magazine or other, did write the truth. 

And I recall recreational reading just eight days ago in Jim Robbins's The Man Who Planted Trees: Lost Groves, Champion Trees, and an Urgent Plan to Save the Planet (New York: Spiegel & Grau, 2012). Here is a report, from what seems a reasonably tough-minded professional science journalist, of forest conservationist David Milarch's 1992 near-death experience. Here is what I suspect, without having much wallowed in supermarket tabloids, to be the usual wearisome stuff - the usual tunnel of light, the usual luminous Beings, I think the et cetera with the et cetera. But I do wonder, on the strength of Mr Milarch's and (perhaps especially) Mr Robbins's credentials, whether we might not be forced, for once, to take such a pop-spiritualism thing seriously. 

In general, a denial of the traditional so-to-speak naive-Catholic-peasant conception of Soul is a bit like the denial that God exists. In both cases, the denial is respectable, and indeed is urged in eloquent - to some duly diligent readers, in compelling - terms by such respectable authorities as Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hitchens. Yet in the end what have we here but another (respectable, worthy) Creed, another (respectable, worthy) Faith? 

I remarked on this blog in the evening or night of 2016-04-18/2016-04-19, under the heading "Essay on Green Catholic Hermits", on some Montréal crutches: How wearisome - baffled non-Catholic people occasionally say, or at any rate in a polite way think - is that repeated Romish fiddling with rosaries and holy water, with incense, with altar cloths, with pilgrimage shrines, with alleged miraculous cures for one ailment and another (one recalls the tens or hundreds of crutches hanging from a ceiling at St Joseph's Oratory in Montreal). The atheist, Dawkins-or-Hitchens, position on the Oratory has to be that of all those tens or hundreds of crutches, each of them - each and every one of them, without exception - is the mute witness to some pious fraud or pious self-delusion: that the number of actual miraculous cures correctly attributable to the prayerful intercession of Blessed André Bessette (1845–1937) and his patron Saint Joseph is exactly zero. It may be so, reply I. But, say I, to affirm it so is to make a leap of faith, no less imposing than the bold leaps Catholics (including me) make on such things as God and the Soul. 

So even hypothesis (3) has to stay in the running, for all we now definitely know. 

Until we can choose on strictly rational grounds among hypotheses (1), (2), and (3), some fog of uncertainty will reduce us to some degree of groping as we work on the philosophical problem of Other Minds. I can only hope that what I have to write in later weeks on this blog, forsaking these present foundational explorations (including the current divagation into philosophy-of-robotics) for my official topics of perception and action, does not turn out to be vitiated by the uncertainties. 

[This is the end of the current blog posting.]